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THE MINNESOTA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
By HARVEY Hos-OUR*
T HE need for a complete revision of the business corporation
statutes of Minnesota has long been recognized. So long as
the double liability of shareholders was retained, much of the in-
centive towards such a revision was lacking, however, in that M in-
nesota enterprises almost certainly would have continued gener-
ally to incorporate elsewhere notwithstanding any revision that
might be made. But when this difficulty was removed by the
abolition of double liability,' a committee of the State Bar Associa-
ation was appointed to draft and submit a new business corpora-
tion law for Minnesota. As a result of its work and recommenda-
tions, the latter concurred in by the bar association, there has
recently been enacted what in the law is called the Minnesota Busi-
ness Corporation Act..2
It is not the purpose of the present article to discuss or even
to outline all the changes in nomenclature, procedure or substance
in the new act. Rather its purpose is to consider some of the more
important problems which confronted the committee, and to indi-
cate the reasons which led to the conclusions as to these problems
which now appear in the act as approved.
Obviously the most serious difficulty in drafting a law for
business corporations is to give the management sufficient latitude
so that the business of the corporation may be carried on expedi-
tiously and without too much interference from the shareholders
or creditors, and at the same time adequately to protect the share-
holders and creditors from the machinations of the management
where there have been abuses. It is recognized that this difficulty
*Of the New York Bar; formerly Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota.
'See note in (1931) 15 MINNEsoTA LAw REVIEW 22. .
'%innesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
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may not have been solved perfectly in the act as to each problem
in which it arises, and that experience may justify or even require
changes in this connection, but the committee's purpose and studied
determination here has been so to balance the competing view-
points suggested as best to serve the public interest. It is not
contemplated that Minnesota should go into the corporation bait-
ing business, nor that the adoption of the new act will bring large
numbers of businesses from other states into Minnesota for incor-
poration. But it is believed that legitimate Minnesota enterprises
should incorporate here, and that the law of Minnesota should
be so drawn as to facilitate such incorporation. These things have
been kept in mind in forming the act as submitted and approved.
In formulating its recommendations the committee received
much help from the uniform business corporation act, the general
arrangement of which our act follows.5 The recently adopted
California general corporation law4 was found to be very helpful.
Also the business corporation laws of Ohio, Delaware, Louisiana
and other states were used for purposes of comparison. But each
question was considered in detail by the committee and its inde-
pendent judgment reached thereon, in some cases that conclusion
being distinctly different from that of any of the other state stat-
utes so far as known to the committee. Perhaps it should also be
added that the committee had before it when each problem was
under consideration a brief prepared by one of its members as to
the then statutory and case law in Minnesota as to that problem.
DE FACTO CORPORATIONS 5
One of the most interesting developments in the law of corpor-
ations is that which has to do with the doctrine of corporations
de facto. While Machen well says: "As an original question, it
is very difficult to sustain this prevalent American doctrine,",, the
3The Uniform Business Corporation Act was drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved and
recommended for enactment in the states by the National Conference in
1928. The uniform act was also approved by the American Bar Association
at its Seattle meeting in 1928.
4California, Civil Code, (Deering's 1931) secs. 277 ff.5Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, clh. 300.
"Sec. 7. The certificate of incorporation issued by the secretary of state in
accordance with the provisions of section 5 of this act shall be conclusive
evidence of the fact of incorporation. Nothing in this section shall limit
the existing rules of law as to corporations de facto, nor as to corporations
by estoppel."6Machen, Corporations 242.
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concept of corporations de facto has been judicially approved in
almost every state in the country, and in no jurisdiction has this
approval been more definite than in Minnesota. Finnegan v. Nocr-
enberg7 is a leading case on the subject. In an earlier case' the
court said that the doctrine of corporations de facto "is not found-
ed upon any principle of estoppel, as is sometimes assumed, but
upon the broader principles of common justice and public policy."
In a recent case9 the court thus summarized the rules of law in
this connection:
"It is settled law that in order to create a de facto corporation
three things are essential: (1) the existence of some law under
which such a corporation may lawfully be created; (2) a colorable
and bona fide attempt to organize a corporation under the law, and
(3) the exercise of corporate powers and functions by the organi-
zation so formed."
The policy underlying the cases as to corporations de facto is
believed to be wholly sound, and it is not the purpose of the new
act to limit the existing rules of law either as to corporations de
facto or as to corporations by estoppel. Rather it has been thought
desirable to follow the English companies' act10 and the uniform
business corporation act' in extending those rules so as to make
the certificate of incorporation issued by the secretary of state
conclusive evidence of the fact of incorporation. What constitutes
"colorable compliance" is often a doubtful question," and, while
the existing rules of law in Minnesota would almost certainly hold
a group which had gone so far as to procure a certificate of incor-
poration to be a corporation de facto, it would seem that in such
case the proof requirements of the present rules may well be dis-
pensed with. This, and only this, so far as the point under discus-
sion is concerned, the new act does.
REVOCABILITY OF FORMATIVE SUBSCRIPTIONS"
By the weight of judicial authority a formative subscripton
7(1893) 52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. 1150, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 18 L. R. A.
778.
sTrustees of East Norway Lake Church v. Froislie, (1887) 37 Minn.
447, 451.
9Mabel First Lutheran Church v. Cadwallader, (1927) 172 Minn. 471,
476, 215 N. W. 845.
'oSec. 17.
lSec. 9.
-'See Johnson v. Okerstrom, (1892) 70 Minn. 303, 73 N. W. 147 and
(1932) 16 MINNEsorA LAw REvIEW 206.
13Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933. Ch. 300.
"Sec. 16. II. Unless otherwise provided in the writing, subscriptions for
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may be revoked at any time prior to the formation of the corpora-
tion and the acceptance of the subscription." This conclusion
obviously follows from the generally accepted view that such sub-
scriptions are in the nature of offers to the proposed corporation.
However logical the majority rule be, it may and often does lead
to injustice where the promotion process proceeds in good faith
and in reliance on formative subscriptions which thereafter are
revoked. Accordingly some courts 5 have held that a formative
subscription is a contract between the subscribers to become share-
holders, and as such irrevocable from the time of the subscription
unless all the subscribers consent to a cancellation before accept-
ance by the corporation. The case of Minneapolis Threshing Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis'( commits Minnesota to the minority view. But
the minority view is also objectionable in some respects: (1) ordi-
narily the subscribers do not intend to contract with each other, and
(2) in a particular case the subscribers may be held bound for an
unreasonable length of time.
While approving the general policy of the minority rule, the
Minnesota Act attempts to meet both the objections to that rule
stated. Formative subscriptions are made irrevocable by legisla-
tive act, thus disposing of the necessity for a strained finding of
intent to contract with the other subscribers or an expression of
such intent. But that irrevocability ceases and the subscriptions
become void if no certificate of incorporation be issued within one
year from the time the first formative subscription is obtained, or
if there be no acceptance within sixty clays after the issuance of the
certificate of incorporation. By these provisions it is believed that
both the promoting group and those who subscribe are adequately
and properly protected, and that a rule consonant with sound policy
is stated.
ULTRA VIREs ACTS'
Commentators on the law of private corporations uniformly
shares of a corporation to be formed shall he:
"(a) Irrevocable until sixty (lays after the issuance of the certificate
of incorporation, but void unless accepted within said period- and
"(b) Irrevocable for a period of one year after the first subscription
for shares of such corporation if no certificate of incorporation shall be
issued within such period of one year, but void upon the expiration of tueh
year."
"4See Ballantine, Corporations 113. 114.
15See Ballantine, Corporations. 115-117.
16(1889) 40 Minn. 110, 41 N. W. 1026. 12 Ani. St. Rep. 701.
17Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933. ('h. 300.
"Sec. 11. I. Every corporation shall confine its acts to those authorized
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recognize that there is much confusion in the decided cases as to
ultra vires. Machen says: "The authorities are in utter confu-
sion. " s18 Ballantine adds: "Rules have been laid down without
intelligible policy or principle."''  In an article in the .\merican
Law Review2 the author of Thompson on Corporations com-
ments vividly:
"After having given a long and attentive stud), to the subject,
the writer affirms that the Anglo-American law with reference to
it is in a state of hopeless and inextricable confusion; that contra-
dictory decisions are constantly rendered by the same court.; that
opposing principles, tending to contrary results, jostle and crowd
each other as the ice floes jostle and crowd each other going south-
ward out of Baffin's Bay through Davis Straits; and that the judge
seizes upon one of these principles today and tomorrow upon an-
other, and enlarges it or applies it according to the seeming exi-
gencies of justice in the particular case."
Broadly speaking, however, the cases as to ultra vires represent
two more or less well defined viewpoints. One is illustrated by the
language of the opinion in Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's
Car Co. :21
"The objection to the contract is. not merely that the corpora-
tion ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it. The
contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not
have been authorized by either. No performance on either side
can give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation
of any right of action upon it."
The view expressed is that followed by the federal courts and a
by the statement of purposes in the articles of incorporation and within the
limitations and restrictions contained therein, but shall have the capacity
possessed by natural persons to perform all acts within or without this
state.
"II. No claim of lack of authority based on the articles shall be a'-
serted or be of effect except by or on behalf of the corporation (a) against
a person having actual knowledge of such lack of authority, or (b) against
a director or officer.
"III. The provisions of this section shall not affect:
"'(a) The right of shareholders or the State to enjoin the doing or con-
tinuing of unauthorized acts by the corporation: but in such case the court
shall protect or make compensation for rights which may have been ac-
quired by third parties by reason of the doing of any unauthorized act by the
corporation.
"(b) The right of a corporation to recover against its directors or of-
ficers for violation of their authority."
1'Machen, Corporations. p. 823.
'-Ballantine, Corporations, 236.
2
°Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Cor-
porations, (1894) 28 Am. L. Rev. 376.
21(1891) 139 U. S. 24, 59, 11 Sup. Ct. 478. 35 L. lFd. 55.
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minority of state courts, and is frequently called the "special
capacity" doctrine.
On the other hand most of the state courts follow what is often
referred to as the "general capacity" doctrine, the underlying
thought of which is expressed in the opinion of Chief Judge Corn-
stock in the well known case of Bissell v. Michigan So. & N. I.
R. Co.2 2 as follows:
"To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts,
is only to put forth a very plain truism; but to say that such bodies
have no power or capacity to err, is to impute to them an excel-
lence which does not belong to any created existence with which
we are acquainted. The distinction between power and right is
no more to be lost sight of in respect to artificial than in respect
to natural persons. . . . When we speak of the powers of a cor-
poration, the term only expresses the privileges and franchises
which are bestowed in the charter, and when we say it cannot
exercise other powers, the just meaning of the language is, that
as the attempt to do so is without authority of law, the perform-
ance of unauthorized acts is a usurpation which may be a wrong
to the state, or, perhaps, to the shareholders. But the usurpation
is possible. In the same sense natural persons are under restraint
of law, but they may transgress the law, and when they do they
are responsible for their acts."
There can be no doubt that the Minnesota court has in general
followed the "general capacity" theory as to ultra vires, although
there is language in an early case" which seems to approve the
"special capacity" doctrine. Thus the Minnesota cases hold that
ultra vires contracts are enforceable by a party who has fully
performed .2  The most common explanation here is that one who
has received the benefit of the contract is estopped to set up ultra
vires. It may be doubted whether there is a true estoppel here,
for the element of reliance is absent where the corporation is seek-
ing to enforce the contract, in that the corporation must have known
of its lack of power to make the same. Further, there is authority
22(1860) 22 N. Y. 238, 264.
2 Rochester Insurance Co. v. Martin, (1808) 13 Minn. 59 (Gil. 54).
24Auerbach v. Le Sueur Mill Co., (1881) 28 Minn. 291, 9 N. W. 799,
41 Am. Rep. 285; Seymour v. Chicago Guaranty Fund Life Society, (1893)
54 Minn. 147, 55 N. W. 907; Central Building and Loan Ass'n v. 1Iampsoi,
(1895) 60 Minn. 422. 62 N. W. 544: Erb v. Yoerg, (1896) 64 Minn. 463.
67 N. W. 355; Davis v. National Casualty Co.. (1911) 115 Minr. 125. 131
N. W. 1013; Northland Produce Co. v. Stephens, (1911) 116 Minn. 23.
133 N. W. 93: Olson v. Warroad Mercantile Co.. (1917) 136 Minn. 310.
161 N. W. 713; Alfred v. Great Northern Flour Mills Co.. (1923) 156
Minn. 15, 194 N. X. 15: Marin v. Calmenson. (1924) 158 Minn. 282. 197
N. W. 262.
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in Minnesota in support of the proposition that those dealing with
a corporation have constructive knowledge of its charter limita-
tions.25 Therefore it seems doubtful if there is a true estoppel in
these cases. That the court has recognized this difficulty is appar-
ent from its opinion in Seymour v. Chicago Guaranty Fund Life
Society :26
"But there are few rules better settled or more strongly
supported by authorities, with fewer exceptions, in this country,
than that when a contract by a private corporation, which is other-
wise objectionable, has been performed on one side, the party
which has received and retained the benefits of such performance
shall not be permitted to evade performance on the ground that
the contract was in excess of the purpose for which the corpora-
tion was created. The rule may not be strictly logical, but it pre-
vents a great deal of injustice."
Whether the court would apply the "estoppel" theory where
plaintiff has only partly performed is not altogether clear from
the Minnesota decisions, but language in the opinions in City of
Marshall z. Kalhnan,27 and Benson Lumber Co. v. Thornton,28 in-
dicates that it probably would do so, the court in the latter case
saying:
"The present tendency is to restrict the defense of ultra vires in
actions between private parties as far as possible, if not to deny
it altogether, except in cases of contracts wholly executory."
Without doubt, however, the new Act goes beyond the case
law of Mirinesota in making wholly executory ultra vires con-
tracts enforceable.2 9 A well known commentator" has pointed
out that this- is the more desirable view, but so far as the writer
knows there is only one case so holding." It was believed by the
committee, however, that, once the "general capacity" doctrine be
approved, logically it should lead to the enforcement of wholly
25Kraniger v. Peoples' Bldg. Society, (1895) 60 Minn. 94, 61 N. W.
904; Nicollet Nat'l Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co., (1898) 71 Minn. 413, 74
N. W. 160, 70 Am. St. Rep. 334; Senour Mfg. Co. v. Church Paint & M fg.
Co., (1900) 81 Minn. 294, 84 N. W. 109; State ex rel. Hilton v. Mortgage
Security Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 453, 192 N. W. 348; Marin v. Calni:nson.(1924) 158 Minn. 282, 197 N. W. 262.
26(1893) 54 Minn. 147, 55 N. W. 907.
27(1922) 153 Minn. 320, 190 N. W. 597.
2S(1932) 185 Minn. 230, 240 N. W. 651.
291t is squarely held in National Finance Co. v. Cramer. (1923) 156
Minn. 79, 194 N. V. 108 that an ultra vires contract wholly executory
is not enforceable.30Machen, Corporations, 858.3
'Harris v. Independence Gas Co., (1907) 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123.
13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1171.
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executory contracts, and our act follows the uniform act and the
California, Ohio, Louisiana and Michigan acts in effect so pro-
viding. Our act, however, approves the limitation of the Ohio
and Michigan acts that ultra vires may be a defense to the corpora-
tion as against a person who had actual knowledge of the corpora-
tion's lack of authority. The California law does not contain this
limitation and there is much to be said for that view, "' 2 but the
majority of the committee thought the limitation referred to
to state the more desirable policy in this connection.
One of the most important functions (if not the only valid
function) of the ultra vires doctrine is that the shareholders may
be protected from the risks of an enterprise which they have not
authorized. Accordingly the cases in Minnesota and elsewhere
hold that a non-consenting shareholder may enjoin an ultra vires
act. 3 If an ultra vires contract has not been entered into but is
only contemplated, there is no difficulty here. The shareholders'
interests demand that the right to enjoin be preserved. But where
such a contract has been made without knowledge in the other
party that it is ultra vires, and thereafter a shareholder's suit to
enjoin is brought, a difficult problem is presented. The Califor-
nia act here expressly gives priority to the rights of the third
party34 and the Ohio Act impliedly does so. "  Our act, however,
does not take away the shareholder's right to an injunction here,
but provides that the court in such case "shall protect or make
compensation for rights which may have been acquired by third
parties." What is sacrificed in definiteness by these provisions is
believed to be compensated for by fairness and justice to share-
holders and third parties alike.
Reference has already been made to the Minnesota cases hold-
ing that those who deal with corporations have constructive notice
of their charter limitations." Almost the sole use that has been
32 See Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corpora-
tion Law, (1931) 19 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 475.33Stewart v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., (1871) 17 Minn.
372, (Gil. 348) ; Small v. Mpls. Electro-Matrix Co.. (1891) 4; *lipl 2'),.
47 N. W. 797; Kolff v. St. Paul Fuel Exchange, (1892) 48 Minn. 215, 50
N. W. 1036; Olson v. Warroad Mercantile Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 310. 161
N. W. 713; Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Rush, (1925) 165 Minn.
121, 205 N. W. 951, 45 A. L. R. 1507.
3'California, Civil Code (Deering's 1931) sec. 345.
• -Ohin General Code (Page 1931) sec. 8623-8. See note in (1930)
44 Harv. L. Rev. 280, 284.
8 See note 25 supra.
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made of this rule in the Minnesota cases has been to limit the
application of the now abolished constitutional double liability of
shareholders.37 Followed to its logical conclusion the doctrine of
constructive notice would preclude the enforcement of all ultra
vires contracts by third parties, for part or full performance by
such parties could not take away the effect of the knowledge with
which they were chargeable under the doctrine of constructive
notice. Further, it is believed that the only real policy behind the
recording statutes as to articles of incorporation is to give a means
of acquiring knowledge of the contents of the articles, and that
the constructive notice doctrine is neither fair nor practicable.3
Accordingly our act follows the uniform act and the other acts
the committee has used for comparison in wholly doing away
with whatever is left of this doctrine.
LIABILITY FOR DILUTION OF EXISTING SHARES"0
There can be no doubt that shareholders are often damaged
by dilution of their shares when subsequent allotments of shares
in the corporation are made for a consideration that is unfairly
low;40 but so far as the writer knows the Minnesota act is the
only one that attempts directly to meet this problem. This prob-
37This was the case in Nicollet Nat'l Bank v. Frisk-Turner Co., (1898)
71 Minn. 413, 74 N. W. 160, 70 Am. St. Rep. 334; Senour Mfg. Co. v.
Church Paint & Mfg. Co., (1900) 81 1Minn. 294, 84 N. W. 109; State ex
rel. Hilton v. Mortgage Security Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 453, 192 N. W.
348.
3Ballantine, Corporations, 279.
3 9 Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 15. I. Shares with or without par value shall not be allotted for a
cash consideration which is unfair to the then shareholders nor for a con-
sideration other than cash upon a valuation thereof which is unfair to
such shareholders.
"II. Directors or shareholders who, wilfully or without reasonable
investigation, either make an allotment of shares for a cash consideration
which is unfair to the then shareholders or so overvalue property or serv-
ices received or to be received by the corporation as consideration for
shares allotted, shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for
the benefit of the then shareholders who did not assent to and are dam-
aged by such action, to the extent of their damages. Directors or share-
holders who are present and entitled to vote but fail to vote against such
allotment or valuation shall be considered, for the purposes of this sec-
tion, as participating in such allotment or valuation.
"III. No action shall be maintained against a director or shareholder
under the provisions of this section unless commenced within three years
from the date on which such allotment w.as made."4 0See Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares without Par Value, (1924) 24
Col. L. Rev. 449, 466.
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lern is more likely to arise in cases which involve non-par shares,
but it exists also as to shares with par value where the fair value
of the shares subsequently allotted is above par, in which case the
requirement that par be paid for all shares allotted does not pro-
tect prior shareholders from the danger of dilution.
To some extent the doctrine of preemptive rights offers pro-
tection to the existing shareholders here, but the articles may
limit or deny that right, 41 and often the existing shareholders are
not in position to make an additional investment when the new
shares are offered. It seemed to the committee that the only fair
way to meet this problem was to give the shareholders damaged
by a later allotment at a price unfair to them a cause of action
against those representing the corporation in making the allot-
ment, and, since a remedy to the shareholders individually would
often be ineffective in that the expense of suit would be prohibi-
tive, our Act gives the right to sue in this case to the corporation
for the benefit of the shareholders damaged. 2  In this manner it
is believed that one of the most common types of managerial abuse
may effectively be handled where it exists, and, what is more im-
portant, be prevented in the future.
PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS
4 3
Under the Minnesota law prior to the approval of the new
41 Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300,
sec. 3 I (i).




"Sec. 21. II. A corporation may declare dividends in cash or prop-
erty only as follows:
"(a) Out of earned surplus;
"(b) Out of paid-in surplus, provided, that if there are outstanding
shares entitled to preferential dividends, then dividends may be declared
out of paid-in surplus only upon such shares. When dividends are paid
from paid-in surplus, notice of such fact shall be given to the shareholders
receiving the same concurrently with the payment thereof;
"(c) Out of its-net earnings for its current or for the preceding fiscal
year, whether or not it then has a paid-in or earned surplus, provided that
if there are outstanding shares entitled to a preference upon liquidation,
such dividends shall not be paid upon any other shares except to the extent
that the fair value of its assets, determined as set forth in subdivision I of
this section, exceeds the aggregate of its liabilities and its stated capital
represented by all shares entitled to a preference upon liquidation; pro-
vided. further, that no such dividend shall be declared if the fair value of
the assets of the corporation is less than the aggregate of its liabilities, in-
cluding such proposed dividend as a liability.
"III. A corporation may declare dividends payable in shares of the
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act it was doubtful whether dividends might be paid to share-
holders from paid-in surplus, and indeed it is not altogether clear
that a paid-in surplus could legally be created at all in the case of
stock without par value. However, in view of the reference to
paid-in surplus contained in the statute authorizing the issuance
of stock without par value,-4 it seems likely that this type of sur-
plus might have legally been created. 5 But section 7470 of the
General Statutes provides that dividends shall be declared from
"profits," and that they "shall not thereby reduce the capital while
there are outstanding liabilities." If there is a valid paid-in sur-
plus, obviously dividends paid therefrom will not impair "the
capital," but it seems doubtful whether a paid-in surplus may
properly be classified as a "profit." The few cases in point are
squarely divided.'
8
The new act clears up this difficulty by expressly providing
under what circumstances a paid-in surplus may be created, and
that dividends may be declared therefrom, with the limitation,
hovever,'that "if there are outstanding shares entitled to prefer-
ential dividends, then dividends may be declared out of paid-in
surplus only upon such shares." The act also provides that notice
of the fact that dividend payments are made from paid-in surplus
shall be given to the shareholders at the time they receive the
same, thus precluding a natural misapprehension in the minds of
corporation only as follows:
"(a) Out of earned surplus;
"(b) Out of paid-in surplus, provided, that notice of such fact shall
be given to the shareholders receiving such dividends concurrently with
the payment thereof;
"(c) Upon declaration of a dividend payable in shares, the amount of
surplus from which such dividend is declared shall be capitalized. If a
dividend is declared in shares having a par value, the amount of surplus
so to be capitalized shall equal the aggregate par value of such shares. If
a dividend is declared in shares without par value then if such shares are
preferred shares they shall be capitalized at the amount to which such
shares, upon involuntary liquidation, are entitled in preference to shares of
another class or classes, or if such shares are common shares they shall
be capitalized on the basis of the estimated fair value of such shares upon
allotment as determined by the board of directors;
"(d) No dividend payable in shares of any class shall be paid to share-
holders of any other class unless the articles so provide or such payment
is authorized by the vote or written consent of the holders of two-thirds
of the shares of the class in which the payment is to be made."
4"Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 7470-10.
45 See Mitchell, Capitalization of Corporations Issuing Shares Without
Par Value, (1925) 11 Am. Bar. Ass'n J. 377.
46See Weiner, Amount Available for Dividends Where No-par Shares
Have Been Issued, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 906, 908.
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many shareholders that their dividends necessarily are from the
corporation's earnings. As so limited, there seems no reason why
a paid-in surplus should not be available for dividends.
The act also permits the payment of dividends where there
are current earnings, but the stated capital has become impaired.
A majority of the committee thought that, with the limitations
contained in section 21, II(c), dividends might properly be de-
clared out of the net earnings of the current or preceding fiscal
year whether or not the corporation has an earned or paid-in sur-
plus. Somewhat similar provisions are contained in the laws of
California, 4 Delaware48 and Michigan.4 Substantially the same
result in this connection could be obtained by a reduction of stated
capital,5" and it seemed to the committee that the corporation's
management should be permitted gradually to restore the stated
capital out of earnings over a period of years, rather than be re-
quired to'choose immediately between the declaration of no divi-
dends and the reduction of the stated capital.
Some corporations have made a practice of allotting shares
without par value as dividends to shareholders, thereupon capi-
talizing these shares at only a nominal or very small amount. This
has the practical effect of giving many shareholders a false nimpres-
sion of the corporation's earnings or financial status, in that they
think the market value of the shares they receive has been earned
by or exists as a surplus of the corporation. This practice is pre-
vented by the provisions of section 21, III(c) that in such case if
the shares allotted as share dividends are preferred shares they
must be capitalized at their liquidation preference price, or if they
are common shares "on the basis of the estimated fair value of
such shares upon allotment as determined by the board of direc-
tors." It is believed that these provisions, which are somewhat
similar to the California law in this respect,5' will make impossi-
ble or at least very improbable what seemed to the committee to
be a type of managerial abuse.
VOTING TRUSTS 7
The supreme court of Minnesota has several times avoided
47California, Civil Code (Deering's 1931) sec. 346.4$Delaware, Laws 1931, sec. 34.
49Michigan, sec. 32.
5OSee Sec. 38, Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota laws
1933, Ch. 300.5
'California, Civil Code (Deering's 1931) sec. 346(a).5
-Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws, 1933. ch. 300.
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deciding the question as to whether voting trusts are valid," but
such trusts created for a proper purpose have been held not to
violate the Minnesota law by the federal courts.' On the sub-
ject of validity of voting trusts there has been a definite modilica-
tion of the older view that such trusts are invalid on the ground
that every shareholder is entitled to have the judgment of every
other shareholder in the election of the directors, the modern cases
recognizing that a representative meeting of the shareholders of
larger corporations would be impracticable in many cases and
holding that if the voting trust is for a legitimate purpose it will
be sustained. 5 A similar tendency is apparent in the legislative
enactments, and 'the California,' 6 Delaware,17 Ohio," and Louisi-
ana 9 acts all contain specific authorization of voting trusts, as
does the uniform act.60
The Minnesota act limits the duration of voting trusts to fifteen
years, except where made in connection with an indebtedness of
"Sec. 26. I. Shares of stock in any corporation may be transferred to a
trustee or trustees, pursuant to written agreement, for the purpose of con-
ferring on such trustee or trustees the right to vote and otherwise repre-
sent such shares for a period not exceeding fifteen years, except that in
case such agreement is made in connection with an indebtedness of the
corporation such voting trust may extend throughout the period of such
indebtedness, all in the manner and upon the conditions in such agreement
stated. Unless otherwise specified therein, such voting trust may be term-
inated at any time by the holders of a majority in interest of the beneficial
interests thereunder.
"II. A duplicate of the voting trust agreement shall be filed in the
registered office of the corporation and shall there be open to inspection
by any shareholder, and by any holder of any beneficial interest under
such agreement, and by the agents of either, in like manner and upon such
conditions as the books of the corporation are open to inspection by a
shareholder.
"III. Unless otherwise provided in such agreement, (a) the trustees
may vote in person or by proxy: (b) if there are two or more trust.es.
the manner of voting shall be determined as provided in subdivision VI of
Section 25 of this Act; (c) vacancies among the trustees shall be filled by
the remaining trustees; and (d) a trustee shall incur no personal liability
except for his own neglect or malfeasance."
-3See Seitz v. Michel, (1921) 148 Minn. 474. 181 N. W. 106, and Ewing
v. Gmeinder, (1927) 170 Minn. 242, 212 N. W. 446. See also (1926) 10
MINNEsOTA LAW REvImw 344.54Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, (D.C. Minn. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 275; (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. f2d) 783.55The change in attitude of the courts with reference to the validity of
voting trusts is well outlined in the opinion in the fackin Case, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783, 786, 787.5cCalifornia, Civil Code (Deering's 1931) sec. 321 (a).57Delaware, Laws 1931, sec. 18.58Ohio, General Code (Page 1931) sec. 8623-24.59Louisiana, Laws 1928, Act 250, sec. 33.
60Sec. 29.
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the corporation, in which case the trust may extend throughout
the period of such indebtedness. Perhaps it should be added that
there can be no doubt that the common law limitation that a voting
trust must be for a lawful purpose is applicable to trusts author-
ized by the new act. But the effect of the act in this connection
is definitely to settle what has been an open question in Minnesota
as to whether voting trusts are valid, as well as to provide both
limitations and regulations as to such trusts which are believ'd to
represent a sound public policy.
CUMULATIVE VOTING6 '
Vithout cumulative voting an organized majority of share-
holders is able to elect all the directors of the corporation and thus
obtain complete control of its management. Cumulative voting
makes possible minority representation on the board by giving
each shareholder the privilege of multiplying the number of votes
represented by his shares by the number of directors to be elected.
and the further privilege of casting all such votes for one candi-
date or distributing them among various candidates. In some
states the shareholders' rights to cumulate their votes is unalter-
ably given by constitution or statute." But in a large number of
states, including Minnesota, 3 statutory permission has been given
to include a provision for cumulative voting in the articles, but
the same is not required to be so included. The new Act makes
cumulative voting permissible unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided in the articles. In addition it limits cumulative voting to
those cases in which a shareholder has notified the president or
secretary not less than twenty-four hours before the meeting that
he intends to cumulate his votes, whereupon it is the duty of the
6lMinnesota Business Corporation Act, Minnesota Laws 1933, ch. 300.
"Sec. 25. III. If notice in writing is given by any shareholder to the presi-
dent or secretary of a corporation not less than twenty-four hours bcforc the
time fixed for holding a meeting for the election of directors that he in-
tends to cumulate his votes in such election, each shareholder shall have
the right to multiply the number of votes to which he may be entitled by
the number of directors to be elected, and he may cast all such votes for
one candidate or distribute them among any two or more candidates. In
such case it shall be the duty of the presiding officer upon the convening
of the meeting to announce that such notice has been given. If the articles
of incorporation expressly provide that there shall be no cumulative vot-
ing, the provisions of this subdivision shall be inapplicable to such corpora-
tion."
62See Ballantine, Corporations 575.63Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat.. sec. 7462.
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presiding officer to announce that such notice has been given.
Unless so limited cumulative voting may lead to minority con-
trol,1 perhaps as undesirable as the total elimination of the minor-
ity from the directorate of the corporation. \Vith the limitation
stated all the shareholders present at the meeting know that cumu-
lative voting is to be practiced, and it 'is to be assumed in such
situation that the majority will so protect itself by cumulating its
votes as to prevent minority control. Our act in the respect last
indicated follows in substance the Ohio act, and is believed to offer
a better solution to the problems incident to cumulative voting
than is contained in the statutes generally.
(To be concluded)
64This actually happened in Schwartz v. State ex rel. Schwartz, (1900)
61 Ohio St. 497, 56 N. E. 201.
